SECRET

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

NIC 3019-83/1 22 April 1983

National Intelligence Council

MEMORANDUM FOR	: See Distribution	
FROM	: Assistant National Intelligence Officer for Western Europe	25X1
SUBJECT	: Warning Report: Western Europe	·
April 1983. I would wish to	ded is my report to the DCI based on our meeting held on 20 f there are any significant amendments or additions you make, please let me know. (U) Sonth's warning meeting will be on Wednesday, 18 May 1983 at 1986 TeE-62, CIA Headquarters. Please have your clearances passed with names of the attendees by noon, 17	25 X 1
proposals to m	encourage you to phone in suggestions for the agenda and take opening presentations. It would be helpful to have your the next meeting by Monday, 11 April 1983. (U)	
		25X1
Attachment	·	

UNCLASSIFIED when removed from attachment.

a/s

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC 3019-83 22 April 1983

25X1

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH

: National Intelligence for Warning

FROM

: Assistant National Intelligence Officer for Western

Europe

SUBJECT

: Monthly Warning Assessment: Western Europe

Portugal

25X1

ALL Paragraphs Are Classified SECRET

CL by SIGNER DECL APR 1991 DERV OADR

SECRET

	25X
CSCE	
3. The CSCE session in Madrid has resumed with unresolved differences betwen West Europeans and the US, and among the Europeans themselves, about where and how hard to press for changes in a draft concluding document offered by the neutrals and non-aligned (NNA). Some Europeans, support US desires for a maximum effort to achieve	25 X
Soviet concessions on human rights and on the mandate for a disarmament conference in Europe. Most, however, would be satisfied with a few improvements in order to attain a "successful" outcome that would demonstrate the East-West dialogue was still alive on the eve of INF deployments. Although the need for Western unity is widely perceived, the US will be under strong pressure in Madrid to back down as the "end game" approaches, especially if the Soviets indicate they can accept most of the	

4. Following the visits to Washington of Chancellor Kohl and EC Commission President Thorn, the Europeans appear to be somewhat less concerned that the US intends to make East-West economic issues the centerpiece of the Williamsburg Summit. Contention over East-West questions would undermine European hopes that the Summit will demontrate sufficient harmony to provide a psychological lift to prospects for economic recovery. Many of the Europeans, both among the Summit countries and outside the circle, remain opposed to a series of preparatory ministerial meetings proposed by the US -- outsiders, because of fears of the Summit Seven becoming institutionalized; insiders, because of concern that leaders' hands will be tied at the Summit itself. In part because the Europeans will differ among themselves -- the major dividing line being between low- and high-inflation countries -about how much "convergence" of national economic policies the summit should advocate, they may find more unity in urging attention to North-South problems, especially in light of the coming UNCTAD session.

25X1

25X1

25X1

"Peace Movement" Developments

- 5. Easter "peace" marches were notable primarily in West Germany and Britain; major events had not been planned elsewhere. The numbers, particularly in Germany, were less than organizers had hoped for. This may indicate difficulties in achieving high turnouts in the future, but analysts generally believe serious and large-scale demonstrations are still possible, indeed likely, later in the year. Moreover, the large number of demonstrations, the targetting of INF deployment or other military sites, and the ability of Communists and radicals to exercise more influence in small and widespread demonstrations could pose a great problem for security authorities. The level of demonstrations anticipated at present are not expected to dissuade stationing governments from proceeding with INF deployments.
- 6. Analysts have noted reports of Soviet concern over too much "balance" (i.e., anti-SS 20 as well as INF slogans) creeping into the peace movement, but differ about whether such concern is real or feigned. There is agreement, however, that at least in the West the net impact of even balanced demonstrations is pressure against INF.

25X1



MEMORANDUM FOR: DCI : Monthly Warning Assessment: Western Europe SUBJECT DCI DDCI Executive Director Executive Registry Chairman, NIC Vice Chairman, NIC DDI ADDI DO/EPDS DO/PCS NIO/W (5 copies) NIO-at-Large (Heymann) NIO-at-Large (Gordon) NIO-at-Large (Ford) NIO/WE NIO/AF NIO/EA NIO/GPF NIO/LA NIO/NESA NIO/SP NIO/USSR SEnior Review Panel (4) SA/DDI/Current Support C/IPC, 2F21 DD/OCPAS, 7F17 D/EURA, 6G42 25X1 D/SOVA, GS21, D/OGI, 3G00 D/OCR, 2E60 25X1 D/OIA, Rm 3N109, DDI Registry 25X1

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/03/02: CIA-RDP87R00529R000200110025-4